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I. INTRODUCTION

Workplace accidents occur in significant numbers in West Virginia' due, in large part, to the state's industrialized and labor-intensive
structure. Many accidents are the result of defective equipment, dangerous products and material, or negligence on the part of employees and
employers. Entities such as chemical, steel, and electric companies that
own or operate the facilities where accidents occur are often at fault.
*

Segal & Davis, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia. B.., University of Vermont,

1977; J.D. West Virginia University, 1981.
** Segal & Davis, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia. B.S.B.ad., cum laude, West Virginia University, 1982; J.D., West Virginia University, 1985.
*** Segal & Davis, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia. B.S.B.ad., cum laude, West Virginia University, 1988; J.D., West Virginia University, 1991.
1. In 1992, 70,317 work-related injuries were reported in West Virginia. This figure
includes both regular subscribers to the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund and
self-insured companies. West Virginia Workers' Compensation Division, Annual Financial
and Statistical Tables, Table 15 (1992).
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Lawyers evaluating a workplace injury cases must engage in the
most thorough investigation possible. Unlike some types of litigation
such as medical malpractice or commercial work, where potential
defendants are readily identifiable, workplace injury litigation may
involve several defendants, not all of whose roles or duties are clear or
easily ascertainable. Additionally, the specific circumstances of the
injury will determine who the appropriate defendants are in most instances. Without a thorough investigation, the action may not be initiated against all proper defendants prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations or may not assert all appropriate theories against the
defendants. In order to avoid the difficulty of moving to amend an
action to add other defendants or to allege other causes of action,
especially where the statute of limitations has expired after the filing
of the original complaint, an investigation of the facts of the injury
and an interview of the injured worker or at least of his or her coworkers must be performed in order to fully and professionally represent the interests of the injured worker and his or her family.
With that in mind, the purpose of this Article is to survey for the
reader the more common types of workplace accidents, the potential
defendants in workplace injury litigation, and the possible theories of
recovery against such defendants.
HI.

A.

CLASSES OF WORKPLACE INJURY LITIGATION

Workers' Compensation

Although the focus of this article is not workers' compensation, an
abbreviated discussion of the remedy is necessary to alert the reader to
the circumstances of when injured workers will be able to maintain
both a workers' compensation claim and a civil action for their injuries.
In West Virginia, as in most states, an injured person's workers'
compensation claim is his or her exclusive remedy 2 for injuries received in the course of and resulting from employment.3 The historical
2. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (Supp. 1992)
3. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (Supp. 1992); Archibald v. Workman's Compensation
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purpose for the exclusivity requirement was to remove the litigation of
workplace injuries from the courts and to replace it with a remedy
which would not require a determination of the parties' fault and
which would provide a more predictable outcome than one ascertained
by a jury's verdict.4
In certain circumstances, however, where a worker can prove an
employer's "deliberate intent" to cause the worker physical harm, the
employer loses the immunity otherwise extended by the Workers'
Compensation Act.5 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
first recognized this cause of action in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,
Inc.6 Following the court's opinion in Mandolidis, the West Virginia
Legislature amended section 23-4-2 of the West Virginia Code and
codified certain requirements which an employee must prove to exist if
he or she is to succeed in a civil action against his or her employer.7

Comm'r, 87 S.E. 771 (W. Va. 1916).
4. For a historical overview of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Program
and its current status, see Emily A. Spieler, Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and
Work: New Perspectives on the Workers' Compensation Debate in West Virginia, 95 W.
VA. L. REV. 333 (1992-93).
5. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (Supp. 1992).
6. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
7. The statute now reads:
The immunity from suit provided under this section and under section six-a [§ 232-6A], article two of this chapter, may be lost only if the employer or person
against whom liability is asserted acted with "deliberate intention." This requirement may be satisfied only if:
(i) It is proved that such employer or person against whom liability is asserted acted with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death to an employee. This standard requires
a showing of an actual, specific intent and may not be satisfied by allegation or
proof of (A) Conduct which produces a result that was not specifically intended;
(B) conduct which constitutes negligence, no matter how gross or aggravated; or
(C) willful, wanton or reckless misconduct; or
(ii) The trier of fact determines, either through specific findings of fact made
by the.court in a trial without a jury, or through special interrogatories to the jury
in a jury trial, that all of the following facts are proven:
(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace
which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or
death;
(B) That the employer had a subjective realization and an appreciation
of the existence of such specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree
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These statutory criteria have been the subject of interpretation in recent
decisions of the Supreme Court
The importance of Mandolidis and its progeny is that in certain
(albeit rare) circumstances, an injured worker may maintain a direct
action against his or her employer as well as any third parties who
could ordinarily be named. The injured worker's lawyer must carefully
investigate the circumstances of the injury to determine whether a
Mandolidis action is appropriate. Simply because an employee works
with or around dangerous equipment and is injured does not mean that
the employee will be able to satisfy the requirements of section 23-4-2
of the West Virginia Code in maintaining a direct action against his or
her employer.9
Finally, one other provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
has potential importance in industrial accident litigation. Section 23-2-8
of the West Virginia Code essentially provides that an employer which
of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by such
specific unsafe working condition;
(C) That such specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a
state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a
commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business
of such employer, which statute, rule, regulation or standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and working condition involved, as contrasted with a
statute, rule, regulation or standard generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment
or working conditions;
(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C) hereof, such employer nevertheless thereafter exposed an
employee to such specific unsafe working condition intentionally; and
(E) That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a
direct and proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (Supp. 1992).
8. See Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990); Sias v. W-P Coal
S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1991).
408
Co.,
9. See, e.g., Blevins v. Beckley Magnetite, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 385 (W. Va. 1991).
The evidence demonstrates that the tail pulley portion of the conveyor belt system
was guarded in a way which was accepted and approved by the MSHA inspector.
Further, the evidence indicated that it only became unsafe when the guard was
removed and a workers entered the unguarded area while the machinery was in
operation. By the appellant's own evidence, it was the responsibility of the dryerhopper operator [the plaintiff/appellant] to turn the machinery off while clearing
ore spillage.
Id at 391-92.
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is not a subscriber to the Workers' Compensation Fund or self-insured,
and is otherwise required to be, loses its common-law defenses and is
liable in a direct action."0 The lawyer should determine the
employer's status, whether a subscriber or self-insured, on the date of
injury because that is the date which governs whether the employer
can be sued. That is, remedial compliance by the employer after the
date of injury does not eliminate the worker's cause of action against
the employer. For example, in Kosegi v. Pugliese," the court held
that the employer's subsequent payment of premiums for quarters when
it was in default and during which the decedent was killed did not
cure its delinquency and therefore allowed the decedent's estate to
maintain a common-law negligence action under section 23-2-6 of the
2
West Virginia Code.1

10. This section states:
All employers required by this chapter to subscribe to and pay premiums into the
workers' compensation fund, except the state of West Virginia, the governmental
agencies or departments created by it, and municipalities and political subdivisions
of the state, and who do not subscribe to and pay premiums into the workers'
compensation fund as required by this chapter and have not elected to pay individually and directly or from benefit funds compensation and expenses to injured
employees or fatally injured employees' dependents under the provisions of section
nine [§ 23-2-9] of this article, or having so subscribed or elected, shall be in default in the payment of same, or not having otherwise fully complied with the
provisions of section five or section nine [§ 23-2-5 or § 23-2-9] of this article,
shall be liable to their employees (within the meaning of this article) for all damages suffered by reason of personal injuries sustained in the course of employment
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the
employer's officers, agents or employees while acting within the scope of their
employment and in the course of their employment and also to the personal representatives of such employees or personal representative thereof, such defendant
shall not avail himself of the following common-law defenses: The defense of the
fellow-servant rule; the defense of the assumption of risk; or the defense of contributory negligence; and further shall not avail himself of any defense that the
negligence in question was that of someone whose duties are prescribed by statute:
Provided, That such provision depriving a defendant employer of certain commonlaw defenses under the circumstances therein set forth shall not apply to an action
brought against a county court, board of education, municipality, or other political
subdivision of the state or against any employer not required to cover his employees under the provisions of this chapter.
(Supp. 1992.)
11. 407 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1991).
12. AL at 391-92.
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B. Toxic Torts
Toxic toit litigation embraces causes of action arising from an
individual's exposure to a variety of hazardous substances in the work
place. While the most well-known litigation has involved asbestos
manufacturers, successful litigation has also taken place against, to
name only a few others, silica, nickel, benzene, and lead manufacturers. Although some differences in the litigation are present, depending
upon the toxin and the individual's physical reaction, virtually all toxic
tort cases have some common qualities, given the type of injuries
which are sustained and the nature of the allegations against the defendants.
In toxic tort cases, the most difficult and time consuming work
will take place during discovery. It is during that time that plaintiffs
will need to testify specifically to the products to which they were
exposed, as well as to-their manufacturers. Corroborative testimony
from the plaintiff's co-workers or other individuals who can testify as
to product names and manufacturers is also helpful. Depending upon
the period in which the plaintiff was exposed, this may not be an easy
task since memories tend to fade over time and many witnesses and
co-workers are unable to testify because they become ill or die.
However, the plaintiff's inability to recall specific product exposures is not always fatal to his or her case. In Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 3 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the plaintiff's allegations of exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) were sufficient to support
a concert of action theory and an alternative liability theory against the
manufacturers. 14 The Abel court concluded that Michigan's public policy would be violated if a plaintiff's inability to recall a product allowed a negligent defendant to avoid liability.' 5 Abel has since been
relied upon as a basis for circumventing the usual requirement that a
plaintiff be able to identify the specific manufacturer of the product
which he or she maintains was harmful. 16 DES exposure was obvi13.
14.
15.
16.

343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 176.
See, e.g., Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co., 363 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985);

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss4/6

6

Segal et al.: Workplace Injury Litigation
19931

WORKPLACE INJURY LITIGATION

1001

ously not occupational; however, Abel has been used in occupational
exposure cases for its discussion of product identification and theories
of recovery against multiple manufacturers of the same or similar
products.1 7
Likewise, in Roehling v. National 'Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Building Products,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that the testimony of the plaintiff
and his co-workers had not established the exposure of the plaintiff at
two job sites. However, their testimony regarding exposure at a third
site made summary judgment on the defendants' behalf improper. 9
The court recognized the problems inherent in using co-worker or
bystander product identification:
Roehling should not be required to remember product names some
thirty years later when he had been a pipefitter, breathing the dust, not

handling the products. Such requirements would, in essence, destroy an
injured bystander's cause of action for asbestos exposure. Rarely would

bystanders take note of names of materials used by others. Moreover, the
witnesses should not be required to know Roehling. They were employees

of different companies, with different responsibilities in the work area.
Bystanders often go unrecognized, but still receive injuries.'

While Abel and Roehling demonstrate that a court may not always
require specific and extensive product identification, the plaintiff's lawyer should endeavor to obtain as much precise product identification as
possible, to avoid the dilemma confronted by the plaintiffs in Abel and
Roehling.
In addition to the discovery which must take place regarding the
plaintiff's exposure to products, there is the need to develop testimony
Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Zands v. Nelson, 797 F. Supp. 805, 813 (S.D. Cal. 1992); Bixler v.
Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 1987); Annotation, "Concert of Activity,"
"Alternative Liability," "Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability of One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Products, In Absence of Identification of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 22 A.L.R.4th 183 (1980).
18. 786 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1986).
19. L at 1226.
20. Id at 1228. But see Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984);
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
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regarding the plaintiff's medical condition and evidence related to the
"state of the art," which deals with the available knowledge on a subject. This type of.information can come from all available communities
such as medicine, science, engineering, and any other relevant segment
of society. By necessity, most toxic tort cases will require documentary
or testimonial evidence from scientists associated with nationally
known research centers who have been directly involved in research
with the toxin which is the subject of the plaintiff's suit.
Significant deposition testimony from experts on behalf of each
side will be introduced regarding safe levels of exposure at various
points in time, the importance and significance-of various studies conducted by both industrial groups and health organizations, and testimony regarding how exposure to a specific toxin does or does not result
in disease, disability, and death.
The compilation of information, such as exposure levels, industrial
and medical research, and etiological and epidemiological data, constitutes that body of knowledge known as the "state of the art." The
state of the art is one of the most hotly contested issues in toxic tort
litigation and has been defined by one court as:
State of the art includes all of the available knowledge on a subject at a

given time, and this includes scientific, medical, engineering, and any other
knowledge that may be available. State of the art includes the element of
time: what is known and when was this knowledge available.21

If asbestos cases or other toxic tort cases sound more formidable
than other types of industrial accident cases, it is because they are. By
their very nature, toxic tort cases tend to involve more than one plaintiff and more than one defendant. The effort and resources devoted by
both sides will therefore be critical, exhaustive, and critical.
Unlike the types of injuries which will be discussed in other sections of this article, toxic tort cases are least likely to be handled like
a traditional tort case. They are capital intensive and require enormous
amounts of manpower and support staff, especially in the trial preparation phase.
21. Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1165.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not yet accepted any appeals on the particular issue of product liability in the
asbestos cases in which verdicts have been returned. The several petitions for appeal which have been presented to the court have been
refused, thereby leaving intact the judgments rendered by the trial
courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has refused three petitions for a writ of certioraripresented by three defendants involved in
asbestos litigation in Monongalia County, West Virginia.22 Until the
Supreme Court addresses the issue, general principles of product liability law are an effective tool in these types of cases.23
The court's unwillingness to review such cases may be based upon
its philosophy announced in Blankenship v. General Motors Corp.2
In Blankenship, the court incorporated the "crashworthiness" doctrine
into the jurisprudence of West Virginia products liability. In an effort
to guide the trial courts, the court held that in any "crashworthiness"
case, under theories of product liability, whenever there is a national
split of authority on an issue about which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not spoken, the trial courts should apply
the rule most favorable to the plaintiff.25 Thus, the trial courts in
West Virginia have great latitude in looking the jurisprudence of other
states in determining and molding the law in "crashworthiness" cases. 26 By analogy, West Virginia workers exposed to asbestos or other
toxic substances should have similar "liberal" protection where the
state supreme court has yet to address particular issues and theories. 27
22. Owens Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Adams, 61 U.S.L.W. 3865 (June 28, 1993);
Keene Corp. v. Adams, 113 S. Ct. 461 (1992); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bolyard, 113 S. Ct.
462 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va.
1989); Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983); King v. Kayak Mfg.
Co., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989); Frances C. Whiteman, Toxic Emotional Distress
Claims: The Emerging Trend for Recovery Absent Physical Injury, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 995
(1991).
24. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
25. L. at 786.
26. "The term 'crashworthiness' is defined ...
as 'the protection that a passenger
motor vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor
vehicle accident.'" Id at 782 n.1 (citing the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) (1990 Supp.); see also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974) (judicial definitions of "crashworthiness").
27. The court has, however, addressed the issue of a successor corporation's liability
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Defective Machinery and Equipment

The cases which arise from the operation or maintenance of defective equipment or machinery do not differ significantly from most
products liability cases. The primary considerations in a case where a
worker has been injured while operating a piece of machinery are
whether the person was operating the equipment or machine in a manner contemplated by its manufacturer and whether the employer or
owner of the piece of machinery equipment substantially modified or
changed the equipment so that it was significantly different from when
it was manufactured. Another important consideration is whether latent
flaws or defects were present in the equipment which caused or contributed to the accident.
For example, in Jowers v. -Commercial Union Ins. Co.,28 the
Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that a supplier of concrete had a
duty to warn individuals using the concrete in a residential setting of
the caustic quality of raw concrete and its tendency to cause bum
injuries.29 The court found that the supplier's failure to warn the users breached its duty and rendered it liable to the injured plaintiff.3"
Jowers merits some discussion beyond its straightforward facts.
First, the Louisiana court acknowledged that "Ready-mix concrete does
not contain a defect in the ordinary sense of design, composition or
manufacturing defect, since the evidence reveals the concrete had been

for the debts and obligations, including punitive damages, of a predecessor corporation in
asbestos cases. Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 Q,V. Va. 1992). In Davis, the court
held
[A] successor corporation can be held liable for the debts and obligations of a
predecessor corporation if there was an express or implied assumption of liability,
if the transaction was fraudulent, or if some element of the transaction was not
made in good faith. Successor liability will also attach in a consolidation or merger under W. VA. CODE, 31-1-37(a)(5). Finally, such liability will also result where
the successor corporation is a mere continuation or reincarnation of its predecessor.
Id. at 563.
28. 435 So. 2d 575, 579 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
29. Id. at 579.
30. Id
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properly mixed., 31 Rather, the supplier's error was in its "failure to
warn of a risk known to it and not to others, that created unreasonable
risk of injury to others."32 This statement demonstrates the importance
of an investigation and inquiry into the exact circumstances of an
individual's injury to ensure that all viable theories are asserted against
all proper defendants. A failure to warn theory against the supplier
was successful in Jowers, whereas an "unsafe" product liability theory
would probably not have been availing.
Much the same rationale applies to the status of the injured party.
The injury in Jowers took place in a residential setting. The same
circumstances in an industrial workplace could give rise to a cause of
action against the supplier of the concrete or the entity which had
directed its use, although the "sophisticated user" defense may be
asserted.33 Without an investigation, however, counsel risks asserting
incomplete or inappropriate theories of recovery.
A more traditional concept of liability based on defective equipment was. involved in Church v. Wesson.' The plaintiff, an underground miner, sued the manufacturer of a roof bolting machine after
the roof bolt wrench fractured and caused injuries to his face, mouth,
and teeth.3 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court directed
a verdict for the manufacturer on the theories of defective design and
failure to warn. The court did allow the theory of defective manufacturing to go to the jury. 6 The jury returned a verdict for the manu37
facturer.
On appeal, the Supreme Court restated the West Virginia standard
for establishing strict liability in tort as "whether the involved product
is defective in the sense that it is not reasonably safe for its intended
use. ' 38 This standard is necessarily determined by what a reasonably
31. lM.
32. Id.
33. For a discussion 'of the "sophisticated user" defense, see infra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
34. 385 S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989).
35. a at 394.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. I& at 396 (quoting Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666,
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prudent manufacturer's standards are at the time the product is made.
The court found that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie
case of strict liability, since the other method of production, which the
plaintiffs expert had testified was preferable, was not technologically
available at the time the defendant's roof bolter was manufactured.39
Additionally, evidence was introduced which indicated that the
defendant's manufacturing system was the state-of-the-art at the time
the roof bolting machine was manufactured. 4° Because the time of
manufacture is the relevant point in time, the court found that the
plaintiff did not present any evidence that it was foreseeable to the
manufacturer that the wrench on the roof bolting machine would fractherefore, affined the jury's verdict for the defendant
ture. The court,
41
manufacturer.
The Church court relied upon Morningstar v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co.42 in affirming the jury's verdict.43 Morningstar set forth
the rule in West Virginia for establishing a manufacturer's strict liability." In addition to Morningstar, any attorney contemplating a products liability case must look to the analysis set forth in Ilosky v.
Michelin Tire Corp.45 regarding a manufacturer's duty to warn and its
discussion of what constitutes a defective product. 46 Additionally,
since comparative negligence will almost always be a defense in a
products liability action, a review of King v. Kayak Mfg. Co.,47 with
contributory negligence, and
its analysis of comparative negligence,
48
helpful.
also
is
risk,
the
of
assumption
As mentioned earlier, modification of equipment or machinery may
result in the employee's cause of action actually being against his or

syl. pt. 4 (W. Va. 1979)).
39. Id at 396.
40. Id
41.

Id

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1976).
Church, 385 S.E.2d at 396.
Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d at 676.
307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).
IA at 609.
387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989).
Id
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her employer and/or the operator or owner of the equipment, rather
than the manufacturer. In these circumstances, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that, as a matter of
Virginia law:
the sophisticated user defense may be permitted in cases involving an
employer who was aware of the inherent dangers of a product which the

employer purchased for use in its business. Such an employer has a duty
to warn his employees of the dangers of the product, and the manufacturer

is absolved of any concurrent duty to warn those same employees.49

According to the "sophisticated user" defense, if an employer is
aware of the dangers inherent in a product and fails to warn its employees of those dangers, then the employee's cause of action is
against the employer and not the manufacturer.5" Although the sophisticated user defense has been frequently used in asbestos cases on the
theory that purchasers of asbestos products, such as large chemical and
manufacturing concerns, were as aware of the dangers of asbestos
products as were the products' manufacturers and had a duty to warn
their employees, the same argument can also be made with a piece of
equipment or machinery.
Probably the best known West Virginia case dealing with modifications made to a piece of machinery is Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc." In Mandolidis, the plaintiff had operated a ten-inch table
saw which was not equipped with a safety guard and had lost two
fingers and part of his right hand when it came in contact with the
saw blade.5" The plaintiff sued his employer on the grounds that defendant employer deliberately removed the safety guard to increase
production and profits. 3 Mandolidis also sued on the grounds that it
was a violation of federal and state safety laws to operate the machine
without a guard, that the employer had been cited for violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act for operating the machine without

49.
50.
51.
52.

Willis v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 793, 796 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 & cmt. n (1965).
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
Id.at 914.

53. Id. at 915.
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a guard, and that the employer had been ordered not to use the machine without a safety guard. 54
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the
employer's acts constituted a deliberate intention to harm the plaintiff
and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action. Modifications to machinery and equipment by employers or operators are
fairly common, so the lawyer should be alert to any changes that have
been made and the possible effect they may have had on producing
the employee's injuries. Consultation with the manufacturer of the
piece of machinery or equipment may be necessary. Manufacturer's are
likely to be very helpful since any modification or change to its equipment by another party would reduce the manufacturer's potential liability. Thus, the manufacturer may be willing to provide information
regarding the operation of its product as it was originally intended, in
order to prove that the changes or modifications made by another
absolve the manufacturer of any liability for the injuries which the employee sustained.
D. Unsafe Place to Work Actions
Unsafe place to work actions are based upon violations of section
21-3-1 of the West Virginia Code which states: "Every employer and
every owner of a place of employment, place of public assembly, or a
public building, now or hereafter constructed, shall so construct, repair
and maintain the same as to render it reasonably safe." The theories of
recovery advanced under a violation of this statute are as varied as the
circumstances of the injuries themselves.
For example, in Pack v. Van Meter,55 an employee was injured
when she fell down the steps of the dress store in which she was
employed and sued the landlord of the building where the dress store
was located. 56 She prevailed in the trial court, and the landlord appealed.5 7 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia distin-

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
354 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1986).
I at 583.
1d

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss4/6

14

Segal et al.: Workplace Injury Litigation

1993]

WORKPLACE INJURY LITIGATION

1009

guished between those safety requirements in the West Virginia Code
which are clearly the responsibility of an employer because they involve instrumentalities or activities directly related to the employment
or over which the employer had sole control and those which are
legitimately shared between the employer and the landlord.5 8 The
court concluded that the maintenance of the stairway with handrails
and safety tread on the steps was a responsibility shared between the
landlord and the employer. 9
The Pack court noted that other jurisdictions have held that an
employees who are injured at work premises through the landlord's
violation of a safety statute or other applicable law could recover
against the landlord. 60 The court referred to its opinion in Sanders v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.,61 where it held that "'the owner or occupier of
premises owes to an invitee such as a non-employee workman or an
independent contractor the duty of providing him with a reasonably
safe place in which to work and has the further duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of such persons."' 62 Thus, the court declined
to require only the employer to exercise the responsibility for maintaining a safe place to work and concluded that, at least in some circumstances, the responsibility to provide a safe work environment was
a duty shared between the employer and the landlord.63
Lawyers must be alert to the specific safety requirement involved
because, as the court pointed out, some of the responsibilities in sections 21-3-1 to -18 of the West Virginia Code are solely the province
of the employer either because of the function of the work or because
the employer has exclusive control over the instrumentality or activity.6 Where possible, however, it is preferable to have a third-party,
such as a landlord or owner or operator of a building, as a defendant

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
218, syl.
63.
64.

Id. at 585.
L at 586-87.
Ld.at 587.
225 S.E.2d 218 (W. Va. 1976).
Pack, 354 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 225 S.E.2d
pt. 2 (W. Va. 1976)).
IL at 586-87.
Id. at 586.
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in order to avoid any possible workers' compensation immunity defenses.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recently.
issued some opinions regarding unsafe place to work actions which
reflect the variety of the circumstances in which people are injured.
The most interesting of these recent opinions is Johnson v. West irginia University Hospitals, Inc. 65 In Johnson, a police officer with the
West Virginia University Security Police was helping to restrain a patient who, unbeknownst to the policeman, had told some hospital personnel that he had AIDS.66 The policeman was called to subdue the
patient after he had made this statement, so the policeman was unaware of the patient's condition.67 The patient then proceeded to bite
the police officer's forearm.68 The police officer sued the hospital on
the theory that the hospital had negligently failed to advise him that
the patient had AIDS and that as a result of his altercation with the
AIDS patient he had suffered emotional distress.69
The plaintiff avoided the defense of workers' compensation immunity because he was employed by the West Virginia University Security Police but sued West Virginia University Hospitals, an independent
corporation separate from West Virginia University. The hospital asserted the defense of workers' compensation immunity, but did not do
so until it filed its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.7"
There had been no evidence presented in support of that defense and
the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the hospital
had employed the plaintiff in a capacity which would support the
71

same.

The court found that the hospital was negligent in failing to warn
the plaintiff that the patient he was restraining had stated that he had

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

413 S.E.2d 889 (1991).
Id at 891.
Id
Id
Id
Id at 891 n.1
Id at 896 n.8
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AIDS. 72 Apparently, the hospital had a policy of warning that certain
patients carried infectious diseases. Because hospital personnel were
aware that the patient had AIDS but had failed to so advise the plaintiff, the court found that this deviation from its policy constituted
negligence. 73 The thrust of the court's opinion is its discussion of the
damages to which the plaintiff was entitled because of the speculative
nature regarding the disease. 74 The court established several criteria
for recovering against a hospital based upon a fear of contracting
AIDS.75 The criteria set forth in Johnson laid the groundwork for
further AIDS related third-party liability cases as well as expanding
arguments for emotional distress damages in West Virginia.76
Another recent unsafe place to work decision is Blake v. Wendy's
International, Inc.' In Blake, the plaintiff, an electrician, had been
advised by the manager of Wendy's to put his metal ladder in a certain position in order to repair a faulty sign. 7 Although the plaintiff
first began to work in one location, he claimed that he was told by the
manager of the restaurant to move his truck because it was blocking
the parking lot of the restaurant. 79 After he moved his truck and began to work in another location, some wires sprang out of a raceway,
causing him to fall and sustain serious injuries. 0 Wendy's maintained
that Mr. Blake had assumed the risk of his injuries, and its motion for
summary judgment was granted by the trial court.8"

72. Id. at 892.
73. Id at 894-95.
74. Id at 892.
75. Damages for emotional distress may be recovered from a hospital based upon a
fear of contracting AIDS if: the plaintiff is not an employee of the hospital, but has a duty
to assist hospital personnel in dealing with an AIDS-infected patient; the plaintiff's fear of
contracting AIDS is reasonable; the patient infected with AIDS physically injures the plaintiff and the injury exposes the plaintiff to the HIV virus; and the hospital failed to follow
a regulation which requires it to warn the plaintiff of the fact that the patient has AIDS.
Id at 893-94.
76. Practitioners involved in similar litigation should note, however, Justice McHugh's
statement that the holding in Johnson was limited to the facts of the case. IaL at 894.
77. 413 S.E.2d 414 (W. Va. 1991).
78. Id at 415.

79. Id.
80. Id at 416.
81. IZ
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The focus of the court's opinion did not deal so much with
whether Wendy's had provided Mr. Blake with a safe place to work,
but whether the grant of summary judgment was appropriate under the
circumstances. 8 2 The court reviewed the testimony and indicated that
it contained several inconsistencies which constituted issues as to material facts properly resolved by the jury.8 3 Thus, summary judgment on
Wendy's behalf was improper and the court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendant.8
E. Electrocutions and Electrical Injuries
An electrocution or electrical injury case typically occurs when an
individual comes into contact with a source of high voltage such as a
power line or a piece of machinery which, unbeknownst to the worker,
is energized. An electrocution or electrical injury case is usually directed against the power company or other operator of the electrical equipment, such as an independent contractor which has a contract with a
utility company or is working near or around utility company equipment. An action may sometimes also be maintained against the employer if the employee can satisfy the criteria established in Mayles
85
and Sias.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' most recent discussion of the duties owed by a power company to its contractors and
employees is Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co.8 6 In Pasquale, an independent contractor hired to work on the powers company's premises, was
killed when he cut into an energized cable.8 7 Evidence adduced at
trial indicated that a cable carrying 2,300 volts of electricity had shortcircuited and that the cable was de-energized prior to the decedent's
attempt to repair it.8s Additionally, the decedent's supervisor pointed

82. Id
83. Id
84. Id at 418.
85. Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1990); Sias v. W-P Coal Co.,
408 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1991).
86. 418 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1992).
87. Id at 744.
88. Id at 743.
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out the de-energized cable prior to the commencement of the repair
effort.89 The plaintiffs sued the decedent's employer and the power
company on the theories of failure to identify the de-energized cable
and a lack of safety equipment. 9° The jury found the decedent to be
zero percent negligent, the independent contractor to be eighty-five
percent negligent and the power company to be fifteen percent negligent. The jury awarded the plaintiff $6.17 million. 91
The court was presented with several issues, including the power
company's right to contribution from the independent contractor, the
status of the independent contractor, and various evidentiary questions.
The portion of the court's opinion most pertinent to workplace injuries
deals with the independent contractor doctrine. Basically, the power
company argued that it should not be liable for the death of the employee of its independent contractor. The court acknowledged that this
was the general rule, but pointed out that there were several exceptions. 2 The court concluded that "[a]n employer owes a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work to employees of independent
contractors who are on the premises." 93 Looking to the facts, the
court found several specific instances of the power company's negligence, 94 which the court concluded were
sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether the power companies'
negligence contributed to the decedent's death, particularly when we view
it under our traditional rule that power companies owe a high degree of
care with regard to electricity.?

The court reversed the verdict only to the extent that a recalculation of
prejudgment interest was necessary and affirmed the remainder of the
96
verdict.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id

IM at 744.
Idt
Id at
Id at
Id
Ide at
Id. at

749.
750.
752 (citations omitted).
757.
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Prior to Pasquale, the Supreme Court in Huffinan v. Appalachian
Power Co.,97 reversed a $1.2 million verdict which had been returned
for the plaintiff. An important difference between Huffman and the
facts of Pasquale and other cases dealing with electrical injuries in the
workplace is that the injured plaintiff was not an employee of the
Appalachian Power Company (APCO) nor an employee of a contractor, but was a trespasser who climbed one of the power company's
transmission towers and was injured. Despite the plaintiff's status as a
trespasser, however, Huffinan is relevant to an electrical injury case
because of the court's discussion of the nature of high voltage electricity lines and the duties relative thereto.
The court had previously held that those who operate and maintain
high voltage electricity lines are required to exercise a degree of care
commensurate with the dangers present. However, the operators do not
insure against all injuries. 98 The Huffiman court found that while the
nature of the high voltage wires did not change with respect to the
plaintiff, that is, they constituted a dangerous instrumentality to the
plaintiff even though he was a trespasser, the plaintiff did not establish
liability on APCO's part.
The judgment for the plaintiff in Huffinan was reversed because
the plaintiff was found to be a trespasser who was aware of the risk
undertaken when he climbed the power company's transmission tower.99 The court also noted that Huffman had a history of climbing
other structures"° which indicated that this was not an isolated incident for the plaintiff.
In Huffman, the plaintiff failed to show that APCO had reason to
believe that a trespasser would not discover the risk posed by the
lines. Further, APCO had posted warning signs on the tower advising
of the dangerous nature of the electricity. Thus, the court reversed the
jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff."0° Although not stated explicit-

97.
98.
(W. Va.
99.
100.
101.

415 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1991).
Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 186
1991).
Huffman, 415 S.E.2d at 154.
Id at 147.
Id. at 155.
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ly, the court decided the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of
102
law.
In an interesting dissent, Justice Workman chided the majority for
creating a standard in its opinion which did not exist previously and
then concluding that the plaintiff, had not met the standard. 3 She
suggested that the court should have remanded the case to the circuit
court so that the plaintiff could have an opportunity to meet the new
standard the court had established. 4
A case which the Huff-man court cited and which, like Pasquale,
is more typical of this type of injury is Miller v. Monongahela Power
Co. °5 Miller, an electrician working for the Homer Laughlin China
Company in its plant, inadvertently wandered into a substation owned
and operated by the Monongahela Power Company but which was
located on Homer Laughlin's property. Homer Laughlin operated seven
substations in its plant and the power company operated one, but the
power company's substation had not been marked so as not to alert
employees or other trespassers to the power company's substation
which operated at a much higher voltage. Miller had never been to
any of the substations in the Homer Laughlin plant and had no experience with the higher level of voltage. He sustained injuries which
required the amputation of his right ann. 1°
Miller's action against Homer Laughlin was dismissed by the trial
court due to the company's workers' compensation defense of immuni-

102. Id.
103. I& at 156. The Huffman court held that:
(Flor a trespasser to establish liability against the possessor of property who has
created or maintains a highly dangerous condition or instrumentality upon the property, the following conditions must be met: (1) the possessor must know or, from
the facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude in
the area where the dangerous condition is located; (2) the possessor must be aware
that the condition is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death to such trespassers; (3) the condition must be such that the possessor has reason to believe trespassers will not discover it; and (4), in that event, the possessor must have failed
to exercise reasonable care to adequately wam the trespassers of the condition.
Id at 152.
104. Id
105. 403 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1991).
106. Id at 408-09.
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ty from suit. Miller then proceeded against the power company based
on product liability and simple negligence theories. The product liability count was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to state a
1°7
claim.
The court found that Miller was a technical trespasser because he
was on property where he should not have been. The court also found
that the power company deliberately refused to mark its property and
therefore "intentionally induced confusion about ownership" to discourage vandalism or other mischief with its property."'
The court explained the distinction among trespassers, licensees,
and invitees and noted that it did not intend to change the law or blur
those distinctions. However, the court also discussed the danger inherent in electricity and acknowledged that "although we have never gone
so far as to make electric companies insurers, we have come reasonably close by making it clear that any deviation from the highest possible standard of care is sufficient to impose liability."'0'9 The duty
owed by the power company extends to every member of the general
public and the court found that it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that the plaintiff would not have intruded upon the power
company's property had it been marked clearly. The extreme danger
inherent in electrical power requires that corresponding precautions be
taken, and the power company's failure to take these precautions and
to warn of the danger would not permit it to benefit from the
plaintiff's technical trespass.110
In Miller, the power company argued that the combination of
West Virginia's system of comparative negligence, its rule on joint and
several liability, and its statutory workers' compensation immunity
violated federal due process and equal protection principles."' The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not believe that the
power company had articulated the appropriate federal standard and

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at

409.
412.
411 (emphasis added).
412.
413.
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therefore declined to adopt the argument.112 Justice Neely invited the
federal courts to establish some uniformity on personal injury matters,
but refused to change West Virginia's tort law without more federal
g idance.113 Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the circuit
court with directions to enter judgment on the plaintiff's behalf for
almost two million dollars.
The situation in Miller is vastly different from that in Huffinan
where the court found that the plaintiff was a willful trespasser to
whom the power company owed no duty other than the general duty
owed to the public regarding the nature of high voltage wires and the
care which the power company must always exercise. 1 4 In our opinion, the difference in the legal status of the plaintiffs in Miller and
Huffinan is the main reason for the opposite results.
Another recent industrial accident case involving electric power is
Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co." 5 Helmick was working for a contractor who was performing work on another party's property. His
claim against Potomac Edison was based on his moving a guy wire
connected to a utility pole which supported power lines operated by
Potomac Edison. That movement caused Helnick to receive an electrical shock and resulted in the amputation of his left arm at the elbow.

16

Helmick was awarded damages at trial and on appeal Potomac
Edison alleged many of the same errors as had Monongahela Power in
Miller. The majority opinions in both Miller and Helmick were written
by Justice Neely who pointed out that "[Potomac Edison] asks us to
replow the ground that we covered in the recent case of Miller v.
Monongahela Power Co.""' 7 The Helmick court declined to revisit its
holding in Miller and affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The importance of Miller and Helmick is that the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia has indicated its unwillingness to accept

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.at 414.

l
Huffman, 415 S.E.2d at 154.
406 S.E.2d 700 (W. Va. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991).
Id.at 703.
Id. at 704.
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anything less than the highest standard of care from electric power
companies.
Electrocution and electrical injury cases almost always involve
serious injury and special damages which are significant due to the
very nature of electricity and the manner in which it injures someone.
Despite the dangerousness of electricity, as indicated by Huffinan,
Miller, and Helmick, it is rare that an individual will be totally blameless or free of fault in his or her actions regarding the source of con-tact with the electricity. Pasquale demonstrates that there are situations
where a decedent or plaintiff did nothing to contribute to his own
death or injuries, but the more common scenario is where some degree
of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff is present. Given
the inherent properties of electricity, however, the plaintiff should be
able to recover if any breach of the power company's duty can be
shown.
Counsel should always bear in mind, however, that the same properties of electricity which will allow a plaintiff to get his or her case
to the jury for a determination of damages may also be a trap for the
plaintiff because a judge or jury is going to expect an individual to
treat a source of high -voltage or electricity with a higher degree of
respect and care simply because of its nature and its potential for harm
a compared to. a piece of machinery.
The plaintiff in Miller was permitted to recover because the power
company had deliberately failed to identify its equipment and thereby
caused the plaintiffs injury by failing to advise him of the substation's
dangerousness. The court's opinion in Helmick mentioned that the
plaintiff was injured because he and his co-workers were forced to
perform work which the power company had refused to undertake.""
The inequity of the plaintiff's performing work not rightfully his responsibility which then lead to physical harm seemed to offend the
court. Likewise, there was evidence in Pasquale that the power companies refused to allow the independent contractor's foreman to take a
diagram out of the print room into the pit where the actual de-ener-

118. Helmick, 406 S.E.2d at 703.
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gized cable could have been identified.1 9 These outcomes, however,
do not alter the fact that even the danger inherent in electrical power
will not absolve a plaintiff of outright stupidity or obliviousness to
danger.
Other jurisdictions have reached similar results in electrical injury
120
and death cases. For example, in Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Electric,
the decedent's family brought suit against his employer and two manufacturers of components on which he was working. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that the decedent's employer had removed a
warning sticker which had been attached by the manufacturer to a
piece of equipment and had replaced it with a warning that was less
descriptive. 2 1 The jury found no liability on the defendants' part and
the plaintiffs appealed. The case turned basically on the nature of the
warning and whether the plaintiff should have known of the condition
of the switch: "Was the general warning [placed by the employer]
adequate where the undisputed evidence revealed that a specific warning would have pinpointed the danger of the fuse being live in the
open position?" 122 The defendants asserted an assumption of the risk
defense, but the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that the decedent
had not been warned of the danger:
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Pearson was anything but
a normal, experienced, hardworking electrician and family man, whose job
expertise had elevated him to foreman of the crew, under the facts adduced, it is unbelievable that Pearson, in attempting to cock the arc
strangler on the fused switch, knew that in the open position, the switch

was alive and that he was purposefully grabbing 7,200 volts of electricity
with his bare hand and that he would be seriously harmed or killed by
doing so. To thus believe would be tantamount to believing that Pearson
intended to commit suicide.1' 3

119. Pasquale, 418 S.E.2d at 752.
120. 618 S.W.2d 784 (rex. Civ. App. 1981).
121. I at 785.

122. IM.at 788.
123. I at 790 (emphasis added).
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Because the court did not believe that Pearson would have acted
in that fashion if he had known of the danger, it concluded that the
warning was inadequate and granted a new trial.
In another action dealing with an alleged failure by a manufacturer
to warn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation12 4 rejected
Westinghouse's arguments that it had given purchasers of potentially
defective equipment sufficient notice of the nature of a defect. Plaintiffs were injured when an oil circuit breaker exploded in a substation
causing serious injuries to two workers and killing a third."z The oil
circuit breaker was intended to interrupt the electric current in an
electric distribution system.126 Westinghouse knew of several malfunctions in the circuit breakers and wrote letters to all buyers advising
of the defect and explaining how to make the appropriate safety
changes.1 2 The district court granted Westinghouse's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that Westinghouse had provided the
plaintiffs' employer with sufficient notice of the defect and further that
the employer's failure to make the recommended change constituted a
superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries."'
On appeal, the court extensively discussed a manufacturer's duty
to warn and reviewed relevant state and federal case law. The court of
appeals identified several considerations in determining the appropriateness of Westinghouse's conduct, such as whether Westinghouse should
have followed up its letter with a second letter or should have provided a visit by a sales representative. 29 The court also questioned
whether Westinghouse should have corrected the defect itself and
should have warned the plaintiffs of the nature of the defect. 3 ° The

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cki. 1983).
l at 1313.
Id. at 1314-15.
Id at 1315.
Id. at 1321.
Id
Id at 1322.
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court concluded that these issues made summary judgment inappropriate and reversed the district court.131
The court of appeals also decided that the failure of the plaintiffs'
employer to take the recommended action to correct the defect did not
constitute a superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. 132 The court
noted that "since Westinghouse's role in the events surrounding the
malfunctioning circuit breaker does not appear to be too remote from
appellants' injuries, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Westinghouse should be insulated from liability due to WPS's [the
plaintiff's employer] negligence.",13 The court thus concluded that
summary judgment for Westinghouse based on WPS's superseding
negligence was inappropriate as well."M
Gracyalny can be treated as an electrical injury case or as a defective equipment case. The court of appeals' discussion of a
manufacturer's duty to warn is enlightening, especially in view of its
opinion that Westinghouse could have done more to warn of the defective nature of the oil circuit breaker. This conclusion was reinforced
by WPS's confusion about which circuit breakers needed repaired,
confusion that the court evidently thought could have been removed
had Westinghouse been more thorough in its follow up with WPS and
with WPS's employees, the plaintiffs.
F. Explosions
Explosion cases, like electrical injury cases, can occur in several
different settings. A typical case is when a gas company's lines leak
or rupture and thereby allow gas to accumulate in an area, unbeknownst to those 'employees working around it, eventually resulting in
an explosion. Another case frequently encountered is an explosion
caused by defects in the transmission or distribution lines which then
injures an individual working on the line or servicing it.

131.
132.
133.
134.

I&
Id. at 1323.
1&
Id.
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In an explosion case, the injured worker's attorney's primary analysis should focus on the party who has dominion and control of the
gas line. For example, when an explosion occurs in a building whose
gas is supplied by the gas company, but whose gas lines or plumbing
are not within the gas company's control or dominion, the burden is
upon the plaintiff to show a negligent act or an omission on the part
of the gas company which caused the injury. This principle was stated
in Everly v. Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc., 35 the leading case
on gas line explosions in West Virginia.
In Everly, Columbia Gas supplied natural gas to the plaintiff's
home. An explosion occurred in the home and a resulting fire destroyed the structure. 136 The plaintiffs brought suit on the theory that
a leak had occurred in Columbia's transmission equipment which supplied gas to tle house thereby allowing the gas to accumulate and ex138
plode. 37 The defendant prevailed at trial on a jury verdict.
On appeal, the court held that where the gas company does not
have dominion or control over all of the gas plumbing in a building
which it supplies with gas, the burden is upon the plaintiff to specifically prove a negligent act or omission by the gas company which
contributed to the plaintiff's injury. 139 In a situation where the plaintiff does not control the system of plumbing, however, the plaintiff's
only burden is to prove that gas escaped from the gas company's lines
and that an explosion occurred. The plaintiff does not need to prove
the negligence which caused the gas to escape when he or she was not
in control of the leaking gas lines.Y
Regarding, at least, the gas company's own transmission or distribution lines or plumbing, it is initially held to virtually a strict liability
standard. For equipment not within the gas company's dominion or
control, the standard requires the plaintiff to prove the gas company's

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

301 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1982).
Id
I& at 166.
See id.
Id at 168.
Id
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negligence. Everly also discussed issues of comparative and contributo-

ry negligence and sole proximate cause.'41
Another decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia dealing with a gas explosion is Peneschi v. National Steel
Corp.'42 Peneschi was injured when he jumped from a water tank
located approximately one hundred feet from the explosion of a coke
oven battery. He brought suit against several parties, including the National Steel Corporation for whom the work was being performed and
two subcontractors. 43 The circuit court jury returned a verdict for
National Steel Corporation and found that it was not negligent in
causing the explosion.' 44
Justice Neely engaged in an extensive discussion of whether
Fletcher v. Rylands" was applicable in West Virginia and concluded
that:
[W]hile an unrelated third party could recover against either Koppers
[Peneschi's employer] or National on a strict liability, Rylands - type theory, an employee of either the general contractor or a subcontractor who is
hired to work under hazardous
circumstances is barred from recovery on a
146
strict liability theory.
The court based its opinion on the theory that it was not willing

to extend to employees of independent contractors who were expressly
hired to work with or around an abnormally dangerous instrumentality
the same protection that employees of a third party would possess for
the same injury. The fact that the contractor and, by extension, its
employees were working with a known abnormally dangerous instrumentality was sufficient to insulate the employer of the independent
contractor, such as National Steel Corporation, from liability. The court
141. IM
142. 295 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1982).
143. Peneschi attempted to amend his complaint to add his employer as a defendant on
a Mandolidis theory, but the court rejected the amendment on the grounds it was barred by
the statute of limitations. a at 3.
144. l
145. 3 H.&C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aft'd,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

146. Peneschi, 295 S.E.2d at 5.
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acknowledged that a contractor's employees would have a cause of action against the contractor and its employer "for negligence that is the
proximate cause of the employee's injury," 147 but no such cause of
action existed for injuries based on a strict liability theory.
Prior to Everly and Peneschi, the court had decided Reed v. Smith
Lumber Co.,' 48 in which it delineated the specific duties which a gas
company owes to the public. The plaintiffs in Reed filed suit for damages sustained due to the improper installation, assembly, and inspection of a gas furnace and the resulting gas leak 1 49 Evidence was introduced that the gas company was aware that the furnace had been
improperly installed and that the gas was not properly venting from
the furnace when it was lit.' The court concluded that these were
questions related to the gas company's knowledge of a dangerous condition and its negligence in dealing with them which were issued for
the jury."1 Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's grant of
52
summary judgment for the gas company.

The Reed court recognized that the dangerous nature of natural
gas requires a correspondingly heightened duty or burden for a company which furnishes it: "The gas company, as a distributor of a dangerous substance, has a duty to the public to exercise care and diligence
proportionate to any danger, which is known or should be known to
the utility. This duty includes 'inspection, oversight and superinten15 3
dence.'
Finally, the court noted from its own decision that if a gas company has notice of defects in gas lines, pipes, or customer's appliances
that are dangerous to human health and safety, the gas company has a
duty to repair the defects or to shut off the gas until the repairs are
made.'5 4 Of course, what constitutes notice is a question for the jury
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
882 (W.
154.

Id at 12.
268 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1980).
Id
Id at 71.
Id at 73.
Id
Id at 72. (quoting Groff v. Charleston-Dunbar Natural Gas Co., 156 S.E. 881,
Va. 1931)).
Id (citing Bell v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 145 S.E. 165, 167-68 (W.
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and depends upon the circumstances of the case. Finally, the court
pointed out that its standard was not one of strict liability.15 5 Before
the gas company can be found liable, there must be a finding that the
gas company had notice of defect which invoked a duty on the part of
the gas company to investigate.
Although neither Everly nor Reed dealt with injuries sustained in
industrial settings, the law which they represent is applicable. The twopart test which Everly and Reed suggest first deals with determining
who has dominion and control and often ownership of the gas line
itself. Once this determination is made and dominion and control is
established, then either the plaintiff has the burden of proof to make a
prima facie case or the plaintiff must simply show that a gas leak and
explosion occurred without needing to prove how the leak occurred
depending on who was in control of the gas lines. 156 The second part
of the test examines the knowledge which the gas company had or
should have had regarding defects in its gas lines, pipes, or customer's
appliances and the duty which it must undertake to protect public
health and safety.157
Peneschi dealt with a gas explosion in an industrial setting and its
language regarding independent contractors and abnormally dangerous
activities is enlightening. Peneschi essentially says that an independent
contractor's employees cannot recover on a strict liability theory because they knew what they were getting into. Peneschi is a continuation of Reed where the West Virginia court declined to hold the gas
company strictly liable. Even in an industrial accident like Peneschi,
the analysis regarding dominion and control established in Everly and
Reed must be performed. The difference between Peneschi and
Reed/Everly will be in determining the plaintiff's status and the theory
or theories under which the plaintiff may recover. Obviously, a plaintiff who is not an employee of an independent contractor or of an
entity such as a power company would have an easier time advocating
a "strict liability" standard than would a Peneschi-type plaintiff, who is
Va. 1928)).
155. Id. at 73.
156. Everly, 301 S.E.2d at 168.
157. Reed, 268 S.E.2d at 72.
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apparently supposed to appreciate the hazardousness of his or her
employment to the degree that he or she may not recover for injuries
solely as a result of the hazardousness.
Litigation in explosion cases may involve more parties than only
the injured individual and the distributor or supplier of the gas. While
the distributor or supplier will almost always be named as a defendant,
other possible defendants are companies or entities which have performed work on the pipeline or distribution equipment. Given the
standard in Everly, if a plaintiff can establish that the gas company has
dominion and control over the distribution equipment, then the identification of other defendants and allegation of theories of negligence will
normally be something done by the gas company to seek contribution
and indemnification.
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, a thorough investigation is absolutely necessary in an industrial accident. Industrial
accident litigation, more than other types of litigation, often involves
defendants who have unique corporate structures or relationships with
other companies which obscure or even completely hide liability.
Therefore, as the plaintiffs in Peneschi discovered when they attempted
to amend their complaint to name their employer after the expiration
of the statute of limitations, it is nothing less than an uphill battle to
convince a court that the amendment should relate back 5 ' to the filing of the original complaint.'59
G. Blasting
In his discussion of strict liability in Peneschi, Justice Neely identified various activities for which strict liability would be applied if
injuries resulted. One such activity was blasting, which the court found
to be an abnormally dangerous activity. In Peneschi, Justice Neely
pointed out that without a strict liability standard, injured parties would
have to prove negligence on the part of the blaster in order to recover
damages. Justice Neely suggested that he would be unable to prove
158. See also Maxwell v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., Inc., 394 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va.
1990).

159. W. Va. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c).
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liability on the part of his neighbor who had elephants parachuting
onto his farm if one of the elephants landed not on his neighbor's
farm but on his (Neely's) roof. Proving either a negligent pilot or a
defective parachute would be impossible and would deprive Justice
Neely of a recovery. Similarly, proving negligence for injuries caused
by blasting would be impossible, given the nature of the undertaking.
Justice Neely first identified Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting
Corp.'6" for the proposition that a contractor engaged in blasting is
strictly liable for the resulting injuries on the grounds that blasting was
"intrinsically dangerous and extraordinarily hazardous."161 In
Peneschi, Justice Neely declared:
The blasting cases stand for the proposition that where an activity is sufficiently hazardous and the likelihood of harm to others so high as to be
almost inevitable, even the pursuit of an urgent public purpose like road
construction will not defeat Rylands-type strict liability with its attendant
spreading of the risk among all who, like users of our roads, benefit from
the dangerous undertaking."
The subsequent case of Moore, Kelly & Reddish, Inc. v.
Shannondale, Inc.,163 confirmed that the use of explosives in blasting
rendered the operator strictly liable even though the explosives were
both necessary and utilized properly.
In Moore, the court rejected the appellant contractor's contention
that strict liability ought not to apply where the injured party had
consented to the blasting and had permitted it to take place. The court
relied on Whitney to reject this assertion, but did not provide a lot of
explanation for its decision. Apparently the finding of strict liability in
Whitney for damages caused by blasting conducted by a contractor
who was building a highway was sufficient for the Moore court.
In addition to physical injuries, property damage often results from
blasting. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
160. 118 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1961).
161. Peneschi, 295 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp.,
118 S.E.2d 622, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1961)).

162. I&
163.

165 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1968).
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Virginia do not differentiate between injuries sustained by innocent
third parties (like Justice Neely in the parachuting elephant example)
and by parties who are employees of a contractor. The ultrahazardous
nature of blasting does not distinguish between the status of individuals: if an individual's person or property is damaged as a result of
blasting, then the operator is liable for the injuries.
IH.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to identify some of the types of industrial accidents and the theories of recovery which are applicable to
each. The scope of this topic does not permit an exhaustive discussion
of every theory that can be asserted or of every type of industrial
accident. The specific allegations will depend upon the parties and
often upon the status of the injured party, i.e., whether the person is
an independent contractor, employee, employer, and upon other factors
such as workers' compensation immunity and indemnification and
contribution between an employer and its contractor. The single most
important component in these cases is an extensive investigation into
the accident. The fruits of this investigation will yield the proper theories of liability and the appropriate defendants to pursue.
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